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ATthe beginning ofthe eighteenth centurythetime-honoured identification ofmental
disease with derangements of the humoral factors still prevailed. Another closely
related, butless well known traditionlocalized diseases ofthe mind to specific mental
faculties. Diseases oftheimagination werethusdistinctfromdiseases ofthejudgment,
memory, or will. These ideas were based upon an implicit vitalism; i.e. the faculties
were envisioned as free and active aspects of the mind in some way independent of
the laws governing the material and biological world.
Faculty psychology and its assumed vitalism are of particular importance to the
presentstudy sinceitwasthisschoolofthoughtthattheeighteenth centurypsychology
ofassociations attempted to discredit. The complex history ofthis new approach is
described in Warren's History ofAssociationism. Several distinct themes are present,
the first and most fundamental element being John Locke's assertion that knowledge
was based upon sensation. David Hume further developed this simple statement in
his observation that the sensation of related objects became associated in the mind
so that the subsequent sensation ofonly one ofthe related objects would bring about
the recollection of the whole series. Finally Hartley explained associating sensation
in terms of the Newtonian concepts of vibration and gravitation. In so doing he
emphasized the materialistic flavour of the psychology, making it acceptable to the
new science of physics, although still finding it possible to evade the charge of
materialism. Despite this pious and ambivalent concession to the past, Hartley's
thought represented aradicaldeparture fromthepsychology ofactivefaculties, which
gradually became discredited by eighteenth-century physicians. Inits place a different
concept ofmental disease was fashioned around the new psychology ofassociations.
This mechanistic psychology dominated the scene for only alimitedperiod, forin the
nineteenth century interest revivedin the active functions ofthe mind among a group
oflittle-known Scottish physicians and psychologists. The renewed interest in faculty
psychology led to a reinterpretation of associationism which was to leave a lasting
imprint on modern medical psychology.
ASSOCIATIONISM AND INSANITY
John Locke first described disorders of the mind in terms of the sensing and
associating mechanisms. His basic formulation was very simple-madmen associate
ideas incorrectly, whereas idiots were incapable of associating ideas.
In fine, The defect in Naturals, seems to proceed from want ofquickness, activity, and motion,
in the intellectual Faculties, whereby they are deprived of Reason: whereas mad Men, on the
other side, seem to suffer by the other Extream. For they do not appear to me to have lost the
Faculty of Reasoning: but havingjoined together some ideas very wrongly they mistake them
for Truths ... as though incoherent Ideas have been cemented together so powerfully as to
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remain united. But there are degrees of Madness, as of Folly; the disorderly jumbling ideas
together, is in some more, and some less. In short herein seems to lie the difference between
Idiots and Madmen. That Madmen put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong Propositions,
but argue and reason right from them: But Idiots make very fewor no Propositions, but argue
and reason scarce at all.1
As Locke spoke of 'wrong ideas' he often implied that madness was a disease of
ideas rather than a disease ofmen. Although Locke claimed that the proper function
of reason was to associate ideas in a rational fashion, he was more impressed by
the peculiar tendency of thoughts to arrange themselves in strange patterns.
Some ofour Ideas have a natural Correspondence and Connexion one with another ... Besides
this there is another Connexion of Ideas wholly owing to Chance or Custom, Ideas that in
themselves are not at all ofkin, come to be so united in some Mens Minds, that 'tis very hard
to separate them, they always keep in company, and one no sooner at any time comes into the
Understanding but its Associate appears with it; and if there are more than two that are thus
united, the whole gang always shew themselves inseparable.2
Locke implied in his description of the thought patterns as 'inseparable', that the
association process was an automatic affair, taking place beyond the control of the
active mind. Reason, though seemingly in control of thought arrangements, was
helpless once the diseased pattern was established in the mind. The diseased associa-
tion had the power of disrupting man's morality and behaviour, until eventually all
aspects ofhis nature became distorted. The detrimental effects of a distorted complex
ofthoughts are described as follows:
This wrong Connexion in our Minds of Ideas in themselves, loose and independent one of
another has such an influence, and is of so great force to set us awry in our Actions, as well
Moral as Natural, Passions, Reasonings, and Notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any
one thing that deserves more to belookedafter ... When this Combination is settled and Whilst
it lasts, it is not in the power ofReason to help us, and relieve us from the effects ofit.'
DavidHartley wasprimarilyinterestedindefininghisownconceptsofvibrationand
association, but practical application of his psychology had an important effect on
medical thought. Melancholy for instance could arise from hyper-irritability of the
medullary substance, predisposing to painful vibrations.' Intoxication, likewise,
favouredabnormalmovementsinthebrain. Madness was a nervousdisorderresulting
from the unnatural associations produced by excessive, prolonged vibrations.
Suppose a person, whose nervous system isdisordered, toturnhisThoughtsaccidentallyto some
barely possible Good or Evil. If the nervous disorder should fall in with this, it increases the
Vibrations belonging to its Ideas so much, as to give it a Reality, a Connexion with Self. For
we distinguish the Recollection and Anticipation of things relating to ourselves, from those
relating to other Persons, chiefly by the Difference of Strength in the Vibrations, and in their
Coalescences with each other ... If an opposite State of Body and Mind can be introduced
early, before the unnatural Associations are too much cemented, the madness is cured: if
otherwise, it will remain, tho' the bodily and mental Cause should be at last removed."
1LocIF, An essay on human understanding, p. 140.
' op. cit., p. 420
' op. cit., p. 422.




Hartley's description ofmadness was this very similar to that of Locke, but differed
in its more physiological, organic emphasis.
The initial formulations of association psychology were not readily accepted.
Early eighteenth-century physicians could noteasily accept the whole complex scheme
of this new school of thought, for they could understand neither Locke's abstract
psychology, nor Hartley's bizarre vibrational theory. Gradually, however, various
elements ofthe new psychology found their way into medical writing; for instance in
Charles Perry's discussion ofmadness we find little understanding ofassociationism,6
his theory being based upon the doctrine of animal spirits and the ancient humoral
theory. Perry was none the less impressed by the claim that madness resulted from
abnormalvibrations, andevenwentsofarastodescribeHartley'asthegreatchampion
of the world'.7 Cheyne, despite his preoccupation with faculty psychology and
metaphysics, wrote extensively on the vibrating particles responsible for the nervous
impulse,8 which he attempted to identify with the animal spirits.9 William Battie had
no greater understanding ofthe basic tenets of association psychology, yet his view
of madness as a disease of sensation showed the influence of Locke.10 In general,
however, onlyfragments of the newpsychology are encountered inthe writings ofthe
first halfofthe century. Hartley's Observations on Man, HisFrame, His Duty andHis
Expectation was first published in 1730, but it was not until the second half of the
centurythat hisideas weretaken seriously bythe medical profession. This mustpartly
be attributed to William Cullen's adoption ofHartley's basic assumptions1' save only
the vibrational theory. In a similar fashion Cullen's views on psychiatric illness were
completely in accord with association psychology.'2 He believed that insanity was
primarily a disease of the faculty ofjudgment. Even here faulty associations were
taking place and were responsible for the disrupted judgment. Cullen described the
importance of the normal and abnormal processes of association for the judging
faculty as follows:
Another circumstance, commonly attending delirium, is a very unusual association of ideas.
As, with respect to most of the events of common life, the ideas laid up in the memory are,
in most men associated in the same manner; so a very unusual association, in any individual
must prevent his forming the ordinaryjudgnent ofthose relations which are the most common
foundationofassociation inthememory, and,therefore, theusualandcommonlyhurried associa-
tion of ideas, usually is and may be considered part of delirium. In particular, it may be con-
sidered as a certain mark of the general morbid affection of the intellectual organs.13
The view that an abnormal chain ofideas was indicative ofbrain disease came to be
the most important and fundamental expression of associationism in medicine. Al-
though Cullen accepted the fundamental tenets of the new psychology, he was more
interested in the physiology ofnerve function than in the more philosophical aspects
ofassociationism. Nevertheless his publications stimulated further study, and several
*CHARLEs PERRY, A mechanical account andexplication ofthe hystericpassion, p. 101.
7 IOC. Cit., 8C0SYNE, English malady, p. 48. ' Ibid., p. 50. 10BAT, Treatise on madness, pp. 35-45.
11CuEN, Materia Medica, Vol. I, pp. 60-66. 3CuEN, Practice ofPhysic, Vol. II, p. 140. 19Ibid,. p. 142.
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books were published that both focused upon psychiatric matters and made associa-
tionism central to their approach.
Thomas Arnold's Observations on Insanity, published in 1782, explicitly attempted
toutilizetheconceptsofcontemporarypsychology. Muchinlinewiththis new school,
he began his treatise with a rejection of faculty psychology.1' This is remarkable
since Arnold made an extensive and detailed compilation of the ways in which the
faculties were usedin ancientandrenaissance medicine. Butin so doinghewasmerely
defining that which he intended to deny. Arnold then turned to Locke and Hartley
and used their psychology as the basis ofhis theory. Arnold's classification ofknow-
ledge into its two main types was based upon Locke's division ofknowledge into its
two sources, sensation and reflection. Since there were two sources ofknowledge, it
followed that there were two types ofmental disorders. A derangement in sensation,
the source of ideas, was 'ideal delirium', while a derangement in the process of
reflectionwas'notionaldelirium'.15 Arnoldturnedto Hartleywhendefiningthenature
of this 'notional delirium'. Since associationism is employed more explicitly by
Arnold's work than by any other medical writer of the period, a summary of his
theory will be quoted in full:
The mind can deduce from its perceptions and experience such relations and qualities, as are
properly called notions; and are accompanied with corresponding vibrations derived from and
compounded of the various sensible vibrations to which they relate; and are apt to recur to
the mind in certain and regular trains, according to the order of the sensible, and notional
vibrations, with which they are associated and combined. When these ideal and notional vibra-
tions occur to the mind in their naturalorder, and retain theiroriginal, natural rational associa-
tions and the mind can retard or accelerate, their progress, to a certain degree, at pleasure, and
can deliberately consider them and compare the past with the present, when ofcourse, memory
holds her seat, connecting consciousness, as Hartley terms it, is unimpaired and the associa-
tionism of truth and decency and propriety, and virtue remain uninjured; in short when the
mind can regulate properly all its operations, it is then a sound and rational state: but in pro-
portion as the reverse takesplace, in suchproportion is it in a stateofunsoundness and insanity.
When such an interruption in the regular course ofthe vibration of the brain, and of the right
operations of the mind, may be produced by each of the variations, above enumerated of the
proximate causes ofinsanity.16
The quotation shows that Arnold's thought was not limited by the fact that he made
association psychology central to histheory. Awidevariety ofinfluences, both bodily
and mental, could alter the natural succession of vibrations; overactivity of the
arteries, venous congestion, or organic changes in the texture of the brain could
directly alter thevibrations,17 as couldpsychologicalfactors, such as prolonged study
or suddenpassions.18 Theinteractions ofthemindandthe bodycould thus be readily
explained by the mechanistic psychology ofassociations.
Arnold's work was significant because it incorporated many basic elements of
eighteenth-century philosophy. Sensation was the basis ofsanity, as well as ofknow-
ledge. The mind, though immaterial, operated according to mechanical laws. Most
importantly for our purpose, insanity became identified with abnormal association
patterns. In general, few ofthe physicians ofthe period made such a comprehensive
14ARNoLD, Observations oninsanity, Vol. I, p. 59.
loc. cit. 16 bid., Vol. II, p. 284. ITbid., Vol. II, p. 287. 8Ibid., Vol.I, pp. 161-87.
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use ofassociationpsychology asdidArnold. Buteventhosephysicians who displayed
no great knowledge of academic concepts ofthe mind, often described in detail the
'morbid train of thought' or the 'perverse association' of their psychiatric patients.
Andrew Harper, for example, noted the common tendency for a fixed 'connexion of
ideas' to perpetually recur throughout a patient's course." William Falconer spoke
ofthe disposition ofthe mind to combine ideas in a fixed pattern as a 'basic canon of
the human constitution'.20 He applied this theory to a medical situation by the
following simple but appropriate example:
The power ofassociation ofideas in the mind is here very remarkable. A child was frightened
into an epileptic paroxysm by fear, induced by a great dog leaping upon him. The fit returned
upon his seeing some time afterwards a larger dog than the one which had caused his terror,
and even by hearing his barking at a distance."'
Francis Willis, too, was particularly impressed by Cullen's work, and regarded
mental disorder as nervous disease that resulted, inter alia, in a decreased ability to
properlyconnectideas.'2 Inafewrareinstancesthedoctrinecreptintotheneurological
writings. Erasmus Darwin, for example, devoted a large part of his primitive neuro-
pathology to those diseases in which the 'association' of various nervous tissue
mechanisms was disrupted." These sundry uses of associationism are important
in that they illustrate the extent to which the concept had infiltrated eighteenth-
centurymedicine. Whatismostimpressiveisthespecificuse ofassociationpsychology
by those few physicians who were both philosophers and psychiatrists.
Alexander CrichtonwasthefirstphysicianafterArnoldtofulfil both thesecriteria.
He was, perhaps, more thoroughly familiar with the philosophical writings of his
day than any other contemporary physician. The influence of these academic in-
fluences on hispsychiatricthought can be seen inhis nosological classification. Three
basic types ofmental derangement were postulated. The first was delirium, in which
both perception and the higher faculties were deranged. Illusion formed the second
category, in which perception was diseased while the higher faculties remained intact.
In the third class of illness, amentia, the faculties were deranged independent of
perception.24 Diseases of the associating mechanism fell into this third class, for
Crichton regarded the association of mental data as the mechanism by which the
various intellectual faculties operated. If the process of association was unusually
strong, the imagination and memory would be so lively as to override the power of
judgment to rearrange the thought combination.'6 Ifthe associating powers were too
weak, the memory and imagination would suffer and a dull intellect would result.26
For these reasons, Crichton felt that memory, judgment and imagination were the
faculties most closely dependent upon proper association. It followed that these were
the faculties to become diseases when the associating powers became distorted.
1 HARPER, Treatise on insanity, p. 64.
' FALcoNER, Onpassions, p. 36.
'1Ibid., p. 117.
2 WILLs, On mentaldeangement, p. 28.
"DARwiN,Zoonomia, Vol. II, p. 138.
"CICHTON, On mentalderangement, Vol.1, p. 342.
2Ibid., Vol. H, p. 12.
IIbid., Vol. I, p. 378.
50The History of Associationism
As the insane idea generally consists in certain combinations of thought whichexperience does
not yield, but are formed in the mind, either by feelings or strong passions and desires, this
malady appears to belong to the imagination. Although we are indebted to the principle of
association of ideas, yet it often becomes the source of much misery and distress, as well as of
many falsejudgments.'7
Crichton's use ofassociation psychology was more complicated than that ofArnold,
and was a result of Condillac's influence on his thoughts.28 Condillac, whilst fully
accepting the fundamental tenets of associationism differed from his English con-
temporaries in retaining the traditional view that the faculties were distinct aspects of
the mind. Crichton, in following his example, developed a nosology based upon
diseases of specific faculties. To complicate matters, Crichton was also influenced
by the Scottish school ofphilosophy founded by Thomas Reid, being impressed by
the dogmatic insistence that the mind was immaterial.29 It followed that Hartley's
vibrationaltheory, or anysimilarphysicalmechanism forthought, had to be rejected.
which meant that only mental data, and not motions in the brain, were associated.
Crichton's knowledge of philosophy made it possible for him to adopt selected
elements from very diverse sources. This eclectic approach had some virtue since, as
with Arnold, it left room for the mental as well as the physical. Since Crichton
adopted Condillac's view that the higher faculties were dependent upon sensation,
mental derangement could arise from any condition affecting the sensing process.
It thus became possible to explain insanity resulting from purely bodily factors, such
as heat, fever, or tumours of the nerves. But since, as the Scottish metaphysicians
maintained, the mind was free and active, it could become deranged of its own
accord. Such was the case in those primary diseases of the intellectual faculties
occasioned by a distorted association process. Crichton's eclectic approach was
flexible and comprehensive but his work, in general, lacked consistency. The view
that the faculties resulted from interacting sensations could never be reconciled with
his reactionary insistence upon the immateriality of the soul. Hartley, Cullen, and
Arnold paid lip-service to traditional themes, but Crichton took more seriously the
claim that the mind could exist independently of matter. As a result, the incon-
sistencies latent in the psychiatric writings of the period became manifest in his
writings.
Both the virtues and the ambiguities ofCrichton's eclecticismdissolvedinthewrit-
ings ofJohn Haslam. In his work the basic problem ofprevious psychiatric thought
was the lingering belief in the immateriality of the soul, a belief that could not be
reconciled with the new empiricism in science and philosophy. Haslam took what he
considered to be the obvious and logical step. He rejected the soul, and with it, all
the traditional views ofthe faculties. After briefly describing the classical attempts to
divide the mind into its separate powers, Haslam gave his own views ofthe faculties
as follows:
. . .(psychologists) appear tobegenerallyagreed, that thehuman mindpossesses certain faculties
andpowers; asimagination,judgment, reason,andmemory ... As far as Ihaveobservedrespect-
ing the human mind, it does not possess all those powers and faculties with which the pride
of man has thought proper to invest it.'
"Ibid., Vol. I, p. 382. " Ibid., Vol. I, p. 378.
'9 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 22048.
' HALAM, Madness andmelancholy, p.8.
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To justify this view, Haslam had to utilize nearly all the elements of the
eighteenth-century psychology we have been discussing. He did this in a unique
fashion, and couched his argument in terms of a novel etymological argument. He
believed that the language of the faculty psychologists was not the product of free
and independent minds, but was derived from perceptible objects in the physical
world. 'Sorrow', a term for a mental feeling, was borrowed from 'soreness', a well
known state of the body. Conception, derived from 'cum' and 'capio' brought to
the mind the physical notion of 'grasping together' or embracing. Perception was
derived from 'per' and 'capio' naturally meant to 'grasp through' the organs of
sense. Thus these psychological terms were based upon subtle relationships with
objects and activities oftherealworld. Since the mind was notcapable offormulating
a language independent of the external world, then the mind was not independent.
Haslam summarized this argument as follows:
If mind were actually capable of the operations attributed to it, and possessed these powers,
it would necessarily have been able to create a language expressive of these powers and opera-
tions. But the fact is otherwise. The language which characterizes mind and its operations
has been borrowed from external objects.""
From these assumptions it followed that the faculties themselves, like the language
of mind generally, were dependent upon those physical objects upon which their
etymology was based.
It can scarcely be necessary, to fatigue the reader, by reverting to the etymology of those terms
which have been considered as siguificant of mind and its operations. Everyone will be able
sufficiently to develop imagination, reflection, combination (as applied to ideas, importing
the amalgamation of two into one) abstraction ... and a variety of others; and to show that
they have arisen from physical objects and the circumstances which surround us, and are in-
dependent of any operation which mind has eleborated."3
The above argument, however bizarre at face value, is but a novel formulation of
the empirical psychology with which we are already familiar. Haslam's thesis can be
reduced to the simple syllogism: Since the mind depended upon language, and lan-
guage depended upon the external world, it followed that the mind also depended
upon the external world.
The etymological argument was only one approach among many. Haslam also had
several less abstruse reasons for rejecting the faculties. The one most pertinent here
depended upon a straightforward application of association psychology. Haslam
compared the innate intellectual abilities of young animals and human infants.
Young beasts, it was argued, developed more quickly than young children, and also
possessed greater powers ofmemory. Thus any superiorities that appeared in human
adulthood could hardly be attributed to higher innate powers. It was, rather, the
distinctively human capacity to form a language which made possible those associa-
tions and perceptions thatprovided the foundation ofintelligence.33 Since the sensing
and associating mechanisms were the basis oflanguage, then they were also the basis
ofthought. ThC adoption ofthis approach, along with the rejection ofthe faculties,
was a logical extension of Locke's ideas concerning sensation, a fact that Haslam
Ibid., p. 9. "1b1d., p. 15.
#3HASLAM, Soundmind, p. 118.
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readily acknowledged. This dependence upon Locke is an important feature in
Haslam's thought, and can also be seen in the adoption of his predecessor's belief
that the perversion of natural association was a characteristic feature of the insane.
Haslam even claimed that the 'proper succession' of ideas was the most important
single factor upon which the health of the mind depended.3 Haslam went further
than Locke and argued that the association process, normal or abnormal, took place
passively within the physical substance ofthe brain. The organic basis ofthe associa-
tion process had already been stated by Hartley, Cullen and Arnold, but Haslam was
more explicit than his predecessors. He summarized his brain-oriented approach to
the mind as follows:
Perhaps it is not more difficult to suppose that matter, peculiarly arranged, maythink, than to
conceive the union of an immateial being with a corporeal substance. It is questioning the
infinite wisdom and power of the Deity to say that he does not or cannot arrange matter so
that it shall think. We found insanity, as far as has been hitherto observed, uniformly accom-
panied with disease ofthe brain, is it not morejust to conclude, that such organic affection had
produced this incorrect association of ideas."'
Haslam's materialism, in both philosophical and psychiatric matters was much less
equivocal than its eighteenth-century variant. In summary, Haslam's thought is
refreshingly straightforward. It provided a consistent resolution to the many con-
flicting elements found in previous works. Haslam vehemently castigated the am-
bivalence and vacillation of his predecessors. To do so, he had to weld together
many elements ofeighteenth-century psychology. The proper functioning ofthe mind
depended upon language, and the latter, in turn, depended upon the materialistic
process of associating sensations. Upon this basis faculty psychology, and the
scholastic metaphysics that was often linked to it, were clearly rejected. Haslam thus
represents the properculmination ofthat school ofphilosopher-physicians stemming
from Locke and Hartley.
NEW ELEMENTS AND THE DECLINE OF ASSOCIATIONISM
Although a large number of books on psychiatric subjects appeared during the
first decades of the nineteenth century, few made more than passing references to
theassociation ofideas. JosephCox,inhisPracticalObservationson Insanity, described
the common tendency of the mind to 'rivet its attention' to one train of thought.
There is an obvious similarity between his simple descriptive approach and the more
abstract philosophical works already discussed. This can be seen in the following
excerpt from Cox's work:
Whatever agitates the mind intensely, whatever occupies it exclusively, always hazards its
faculties, inducing a state favourable to the attack ofmental disease. Riveted attention to one
train ofthought, is a very frequent source ofinsanity; the first effects ofthis dangerous practice
areobvious inthekm ... ofvolition, in aninabilitytoabstract themindfromthesubject, which
so interests and,occupies it ... It isacuriousfact,that apeculiaritysomewhatanalogousattaches
to the senseofhearing, sight,andfeeling; whateverhasoccupiedeitherofthemfor aconsiderable
length of time, will seem to be present long after it is dismissed; thus the sense of motion after
sailing, the perpetual r e oftunes, etc."
HAMLAm, Observations onmadness, p. 34.
6 HAsLAM, Madness andmeancholy, p. 240. a Cox, PracticalObservations oninsanity, p. 15.
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Cox's allusiontothepersistence ofsensation aftertheremoval oftheelicitingstimulus
is ofparticularinterest. Thepersistence ofmentaldatainthe mind was afundamental
assumption upon which association psychology was based. It is remarkable that
Cox should make this traditional and sophisticated analogy in a basically simple and
practical treatise which was almost devoid ofreferences to academic psychology.
Other uses ofassociationism were not so subtle. In Allen's Essay of Classification
it is suggested that mental hospitals should have several buildings, each of distinct
style and appearance, in order that patients, upon improving, could be moved into
differentquarters. Itwasassumedthatduringtheworstphase ofanillnessthepatients
developed 'painful associations' with objects in the immediate environment, which
could be broken merely by placing the ill person in a new building.37 Allen asserted,
in a similar fashion, that patients were not advised to leave the institutions since
'painful and dangerous association', of which the patient might not even be aware,
were commonly attached to homes and families.-"
A wealth of such practical applications of and superficial allusions to 'associated
ideas' can be found inthe psychiatric writings ofHaslam's time. The manyreferences
to the 'morbid train of thoughts' indicate that the concept of associations was not
merely the preoccupation ofthe philosophers. Strange orincoherentthought patterns
were thought to be a fundamental characteristic of the mentally ill.
Association psychology, as a school of thought, ceased to play a significant role
in the English writings ofthe early nineteenth century. Haslam greatly influenced the
physicians of his day, although they were more impressed by his organic approach
than by the eighteenth-century psychology upon which it was based. They were less
interested in mental phenomena than in physiology and pathology of the brain.
Spurzheimreferred to Haslam as the source ofhis beliefthat mentaldisease would be
a mystery until the functions ofthe brain were understood.39 It was the materalistic
assumptions ofthe new science ofphrenology that accounted for much ofits appeal.
William Lawrence, in a typical fashion, found it hard to accept the phrenologists'
specific views on the functions of the brain, but nevertheless welcomed the new
'science' since itproperly assumed amaterial basis forthought.40
Another sequel to Haslam's brain-oriented approach was the development of
neuropathology. Haslam himselfcarried out dissections on the brains ofthe insane,
as did Lawrence,4 Crowther,'42 Burrows,43 and numerous French physicians. It was
hoped that the pathological appearance of the brain would provide a new method
forclassifyinginsanity. Burrowsdogmatically statedthatthis newapproachprecluded
the psychological classifications ofthe preceding century."
Burrow'srejectionoftheacademicapproachoftheeighteenth-centurypsychologists
was a common tendency observed among other nineteenth-century writers. John
Mayo, in his treatise On Insanity, rejected the nosologies ofArnold and Crichton as
7 ALLEN, On insanity, p. 3 *8Ibid., p. 97.
3 SPU1zIRZm, Observations on the derangedmanifestations ofthe mind, pp. 7, 67.
40 LAwnNcE, Lectures onphysiology, zoology and the naturalhistory ofman, p. 200. 41Ibid., p. 99.
4' CROWTHER, Insanity, title page.
"BuRRows, Insanity, p. 67. "Ibid., p. 251.
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'toopsychological'.4' The study ofinsanitywasthestudy ofthebrain, andpsychology
had no function but to retard progress." In a similar fashion David Uwins rejected
the psychological distinctions of Arnold because they did not conform with clinical
observations.47 Uwinsregarded Haslamasthegreatauthority oftheday onpsychiatric
matters, but criticized him for being 'a little too philosophical'.'8 Spurzheim did not
even discuss the views of Locke and Arnold. 'They are of no practical use and I
shall not intrude upon the time of my readers with their consideration."49
It is remarkable that eighteenth-century psychology, commonly thought of in its
own day as progressive and empirical, was considered speculative and metaphysical
in the following century. Those few physicians ofthe period who retained an interest
inthepurely mentallookedto PinelandtheFrenchschool ratherthantotheirEnglish
predecessors. The French beliefthatthe moral sensecould be derangedinthe absence
of intellectual disease was discussed in many psychiatric works, especially those of
William Neville5° and Edward Seymour,61 This concept also greatly influenced the
development of medical jurisprudence through the efforts of James Prichard. Other
writers oftheperiodspokeofthemoral(asopposed tothephysical)causes ofinsanity,
an idea closely related to the development of the non-restraint movement and to
moral treatment. Thus a number ofdiverse elements can be discerned in the English
psychiatry of the early nineteenth century. The new French concepts, the primitive
science ofphrenology, and the pathological studies ofthe brain did much to occupy
the attention of the physicians interested in mental diseases. These new elements,
coupled with the prevalent scepticism concerning matters ofthe mind, left little room
for the association psychology, which had been so important during the previous
century.
SCOTIISH REINTERPRETATION OF ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY
The rejection of association psychology by Burrows, Spurzheim, and their prag-
maticcolleagues did not meanthattheconcept ofmentalassociations washeard ofno
more. The psychology of Hume and Hartley was not merely a historical curiosity
whose medical use was confined to a sect ofextraordinarily philosophical eighteenth-
century physicians, for it still held an appeal in academic circles. Warren has shown
how James Mill adopted the basic concepts ofHume and Hartley, and applied them
to political theory, law, ethics, and to a wide variety of other subjects.52 Alexander
Bain, too, wrote an extensive treatise in defence of the whole doctrine of associa-
tionism which greatly impressed John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. The English
philosophers considered the psychology ofHume and Hartley well worth preserving,
but insofar as medical psychology is concerned, the most interesting nineteenth-
century use ofassociationism is to be found among a little known group of Scottish
psychologists and physicians.
Thehistory ofideas often follows patternsthat are moregeographical thanchrono-
4" MAYO, Treatise on insanity, p. 7. "Ibid., p. 89.
UwiNs, A treatise on the disorders oJ'the brain and nervous system, p. 28. "Ibid., p. 89. 49SPuRzHEim, op. cit., p. 92. 6' NEviLE, On insanity, p. 19.
6SEYMoUR, Observations on medical treatment ofinsanity, p. 35.
"WARRN, History ofassociationism, p. 37.
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logical. This can be seen in the rejection ofthe English psychology by certain Scottish
philosophers as early as the mid-eighteenth century, when the influence of Newton,
Locke and Hartley was at its height. The Scottish philosopher-physician, John
Gregory, opposed the mechanistic philosophy of 'the neighbouring country' and
praised the 'enlarged genius' ofthevitalist, George Stahl.53At the same time, Thomas
Reid formulated many of the basic assumptions of the Scottish 'common sense'
school of philosophy. He disagreed with the attempts of Hume and his English
colleagues to reduce intellectual activity to the physiological processes of sensation
and association, for he was opposed to the way in which these mechanistic concepts
neglected the soul and its innate activities. To combat a growing scepticism, Reid
returned to thefacultypsychology which hisprogressive contemporaries had rejected.
It was not the biological faculties ofAristotle and Galen that interested the Scottish
philosopher. In quite a different fashion Reid restated the highly metaphysical,
scholastic view of the mind." Intellectual activity was based upon innate inductive
powers called faculties. The dogmatic and radical nature of Reid's thought can be
seen in his reluctance to allow even perception to take place in the material world.
The intellect 'sees' or the intellect 'hears' directly; i.e. these processes took place
simply because God had given man the perceptive faculties.55 Reid dismissed the
English belief that objects yielded impressions transmitted along the nerves and in
this way pushed a dualistic interpretation offaculty psychology to its further limit,
for even Aquinas had allowed the sensitive faculty to operate through bodily organs.
Few of the Scottish philosophers completely accepted Reid's radical view of the
faculties, although the general emphasis upon the innate power of the mind to act
independently ofsensation was the common denominator of Scottish philosophy. It
was perhaps Scotland's conservative Presbyterianism that dictated these traditional
views. Certain ofReid's followers were nevertheless interestedin HumeandHartley's
associations, an interest which complicated matters considerably since associa-
tionism and faculty psychology were historically linked to very different schools of
thought. A compromise of some sort was necessary and to effect this the Scottish
philosophers redefined the tenets ofassociation psychology.
Thomas Brown's writings in the early nineteenth century show a greater affinity
for Hume than Reid. Brown wrote extensively on the laws ofassociation, and with
the sole exception ofHartley, he made this concept more central to his thought than
any other philosopher we have discussed. His substitution ofthe term suggestion for
associationshowsthatBrowncouldneverbeconsidered anadherentoftheeighteenth-
century school. The former term was considered more desirable since it left room for
the participation of the mind.56 The intellect could actively respond to sensations
(suggestions) by perceiving relationships with prior sensations. Such a concept was
quite different from the eighteenth-century idea that associations took place auto-
matically, i.e. the earlier school maintained that sensations (ideas) were associated
simply because they preserved relationships of external objects in time and space.
For the eighteenth-century psychologists the mind remained passive and did little
UGRWORY, A comparative view on the state ofthefaculties, p. 8.
"RID, Essay on the intellectualpowers ofman, pp. 6-7.
6Ibid., p. 54.
"BROwN, Lectures on thephilosophy ofthe human mind, Vol. HI, p. 336.
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more than perceive. To combat these ideas, Brown claimed that sensations did not
merely call forth the operation ofautomatic, associating laws that were dictated by
the environment. Sensations acted as suggestions upon which the mind could operate
by forming relationships as it saw fit. The precise role of the mind in connecting
thoughtis moreprecisely delineated in Brown's distinction between simple suggestion
and relative suggestion. The process ofsimple suggestion was nearly identical to that
ofassociation as defined in the previous century. But relative suggestion, also called
the faculty of comparison, involved an active process by which relationships were
established by the mind's own effort. This distinction was illustrated inthefollowing
way: The perception of an individual might be naturally associated with certain
perceptions ofthe home, family, and clothes ofthat individual. These objects shared
the commonproperty ofhavingbeenperceived at somepriortimein connection with
that individual. Such correlations might be explained upon the basis of the laws of
simple suggestibility; i.e. the suggestion was derived from obvious relationships in
the external world. Ifthis individual were to possess some remarkable feature, such
as an unusually great height, then the perception of him might bring about the
thought of some totally distinct person with the opposite characteristic of being
extremely short.57 In the latterinstance, it was the mind, and not the external world,
that formed the association. Since simple suggestion could not explain this second
type of association, the law of relative suggestibility was necessary. In general, the
latent scholastic concepts of Reid can be found in Brown's treatment ofassociation
psychology. It must be admitted that these concepts were secondary to Brown's
straightforward notion of simple suggestion, which differed little from eighteenth-
century associationism. The departure from the thought of the previous century is
to be found in the writings of Dugald Stewart, Brown's Scottish contemporary.
Stewart's treatment ofthe phenomena ofmental associations is quite different from
that of his colleague, yet the same basic compromise prevailed. He accepted the
traditional notion that perceptible objects had a tendency to awaken thoughts in the
mind independent of any mental process," but also incorporated Reid's approach
when he claimed that the associating ability ofthe mind was controlled by various
distinct faculties. Thus the exact content of any mental association depended upon
whether or not the faculty ofattention was engaged.59 In a similarfashion, the mind
could voluntarily alter a given train ofthought by singling out one distinct element
andfocusingthe mind uponit." In this way thetraditional scholastic emphasis upon
the freedom ofthewill, thehighestfaculty ofall, was reconciled with the progressive,
sceptical psychology ofthe eighteenth century.
Stewartwroteextensivelyupontheimportance oftheassociatingprocessforvarious
mental disciplines. The power of the mind to arrange thoughts in new and unique
combinations was seen to be the basis ofhumour, poetry, and science.61 In the light
of later developments, the most important of Stewart's applications of associa-
tionisminvolved thephenomena ofsleep anddreaming. The application ofhistheory
to these phenomena is especially pertinent since it admirably demonstrates Stewart's
N Ibid., p. 342.
STEWARRT, Elements ofthephilosophy ofthe human mind, Vol. Dl, p. 252.
"9Ib d. p. 260. "Ibid., p. 267.
1Ibld., pp. 274-85.
57R. Hoeldtke
eclectic treatment of the associating process. The basic argument was very simple.
Stewart claimed that during sleep the passive natural associations could take place
without the perpetual interference of the active powers of mind. Since the will and
the attention were suspended, thoughts could be connected passively after the fashion
ofthe eighteenth-century philosophers. This meant that the dreaming state provided
a valuable opportunity for examining the associating process directly.62 Since the
active faculties ceased to function, the natural, involuntary associations came to the
surface. Stewart summarized his application of association psychology to the
phenomena ofsleep and dreaming as follows:
... the same laws ofassociation which regulate the train ofour thoughts while awake, continue
to operate during sleep. I now proceed to consider,how farthecircumstanceswhichdiscriminate
dreaming from our waking thoughts, correspond with those which might be expected to result
from the suspension ofthe will.
If the influence of the will is suspended during sleep, all our voluntary operations, such as
recollection, reasoning, etc. must also be suspended.
That this reallyis thecase,theextravagance andinconsistencyofour dreamsaresuflicient proofs.
We frequently confound together times and places the most remote of each other; and, in the
courseofthe same dream, conceive the same person asexisting in different parts ofthe world . . .
All this proves clearly, that the subjects which then occupy our thoughts, are such as present
themselves to the mind spontaneously and that we have no power of employing our reason.63
Such an interest in sleep and dreaming could never have developed in the English
School of the previous century since the mind, given no active power of its own,
could hardly be capable ofbeing suspended. Stewart also described other situations
inwhichthe faculties ofthemindlostcontrolovertheassociatingprocess. In somnam-
bulism, for example, a large measure ofthe powers ofmind were suspended so that
thought was basically spontaneous and uncontrolled. The same interpretation was
applied to madness:
In madness, the power of the will over the body remains undiminished, while its influence in
regulating the train of thought is in a great measure suspended; either in consequence of a
particular idea, which engrosses the attention, to the exclusion of everything else, and which
we find it impossible to banish by our efforts; or in consequence of our thoughts succeeding
each other with such rapidity, that we are unable to stop the train."
The above quotation appears much like the standard eighteenth-century application
ofassociation psychology, but there was a new emphasis in Stewart's thought on the
power ofthe will to control associations. This concept came to play a major role in
the psychiatric writings of the time.
SCOTrISH ASSOCIATIONISM IN MEDICAL WRITINGS
James Prichard and John Conolly were both educated in Edinburgh where they
became familiar with the ideas ofBrown and Stewart. Although academic questions
were not the primary interest of either of these two English physicians, both made
extensive reference to the psychology ofmental associations in their medical writings.
Prichard rejected Hartley's mechanistic views ofthemind, andsubstitutedthe Scottish
view that ideas could be connected actively or passively.5 Prichard quoted Stewart
'*Ibid, pp.298-305. "Ibid., p. 299. "Ibid., p. 304.
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as the source ofhis beliefthat insanity involved a suspension ofthe active associating
power.66 Stewart's influence thus produced a subtle shift from the eighteenth-century
view that the associations themselves were diseased. It was rather the scholastic
faculty ofvolition that was considered the primary site ofderangement.
. . . the loss of voluntary power over the succession of ideas is so great in a certain period of
dementia that the individual affected is incapable by any effort of mind of carrying on the
series ofhis thoughts to the end ofa sentence or proposition.67
Toregardinsanity as adisease ofthewillfitted wellwith Prichard's interestinforensic
psychiatry, while his religious beliefs agreed with the theology that was latent in the
Scottish concept ofmind. This perhaps explains why Prichard broke with his sceptical
English predecessors and turned to the Scottish and French schools.
John Conolly's concept ofinsanity was nearly identical to that ofPrichard. Insane
patients were described in whom the involuntary associations were so strong that
ideas could nolonger be connected by the will." In his definition ofinsanity Conolly
claimed that the primary site of disease, was the comparing faculty,69 an idea un-
doubtedly derived from the Scottish school. The faculty of comparison, it will be
remembered, was an important focus of discussion for the Scottish psychologists
since it was generally considered equivalent to Thomas Brown's process of relative
suggestibility. The psychology of Stewart and Brown also influenced Scottish phy-
sicians; John Abercrombie, for instance, considered Brown's division of association
into simple and relative suggestion a fundamental concept, for associations could be
classified on the basis of whether or not they were made voluntarily.70 Abercrombie
further claimed that spontaneous associations could be observed in pure form in
states of dreaming, somnambulism, or insanity.71 But at this point, he made the
important observation that passive associations often took place in the absence of
conscious awareness.72 This notion wasimplicitinthewritings ofStewartbutwere not
elaborated upon; Stewart did not relate the associating process to the doctrine ofthe
conscious mind. Even Abercrombie only made this correlation in a hasty and im-
precise fashion. Nevertheless the location of the associating process within the
realm of subconscious mental activity came to be a very important outgrowth of
Stewart's and Brown's psychology as it was developed by Sir William Hamilton and
Thomas Laycock, the two most influential Scottish psychologists of the century.
ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SUBCONSCIOUS MIND
The philosophy of William Hamilton resists an easy explication. As the most
erudite member ofthe Scottish school, Hamilton had studied medicine, law, classics,
and philosophy. Hislearning reinforced the unique and radical nature ofhis thought.
As a result, Hamilton was an autocratic figure among the British philosophers ofthe
mid-nineteenth century. Even John Stuart Mill dedicated one of his works to a
consideration ofHamilton's thought. In addition, Hamilton's great genius impressed
the physicians, despite his neglect of the medical approach he was equipped to
employ. This can be seen in Thomas Laycock's work, which, though original and
66FRucHAR, On insanity, p. 94. '7Ibid, p. 95
68CNOLLY, Indications ofinsanity, p. 154. 9 Ibid., p. 300.
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comprehensive in its own right, was heavily indebted to his predecessor's thought.
Hamilton and Laycock, both highly learned and highly influential, provided the
logical culmination of their school, standing last in that line of eclectic Scottish
philosophers which sprang from Hume and Reid.
Hamilton's extensive knowledge of philosophy made it possible for him to adopt
ideas from very diverse sources. This is admirably demonstrated in the doctrine of
subconscious mental activity. This complicated theory, in a fashion typical of
Hamilton's philosophy, stemmed from several distinct and basically unrelated argu-
ments. Hamilton presented his thesis in a highly abstract context centred around a
discussion ofDescartes, Leibnitz, and Locke.73 Descartes was the original proponent
ofthe view that the mind is continually active. This was based upon one ofthefamous
Cartesian self-evident propositions: i.e. since thought was the defining property ofits
underlying substance, the soul, the two concepts could never be divorced. Locke
challenged this thesis in the simple observation that thought and consciousness were
suspended during sleep. Leibnitz remained true to the Cartesian doctrine when he
argued thatthought wasperpetuated intheform ofdreams. Locke'sclaimthatdreams
only occurred infrequently was countered by Leibnitz's further assertion that dreams
often took place beyond the level of awareness. Hamilton extended Leibnitz's argu-
ment by insisting that dreaming always accompanied sleep. This was illustrated by
Leibnitz's reference to the host of feeble perceptions that occur upon waking from
sleep. Hamilton dramatized Leibnitz's observation by carrying out an experiment
upon himself in which he allowed himself to be awakened several times from deep
sleep. In each instance, he argued, proper application of the mind revealed some
fleeting thought associations barely within the limits of awareness.
... when suddenly awakened during sleep (and to ascertain the fact I have caused myself to be
aroused at different seasons of the night), I have always been in the middle of a dream. The
recollection of this dream was not always equally vivid. On some occasions I was able to trace
it back until the train was gradually lost at a remote distance; on others, I was scarcely certain
of more than the fact that I was hardly aware of more than one or two links in the chain; and
sometimes was scarcely aware of more than the fact, that I was not awakened from an un-
conscious state ... When snatched suddenly from the twilight of our sleeping imaginations,
and placed in the lustre ofwaking perceptions, the necessary effect is to obliterate the traces of
our dreamns.74
Upon these arguments Hamilton based his claim that the dreaming state, though
often hidden from awareness, was a constant feature ofsleep. In addition to Leibnitz,
Hamilton quoted his German contemporary, Immanuel Kant, as the source of this
idea. But in spite ofthese diverse influences Hamilton's view ofdreaming was much
in accord with his Scottish predecessors. The only difference was that the earlier
writers, still vaguely in touch with eighteenth-century concepts, viewed dreaming as
a manifestation ofthe passive mind ofthe early associationists. Hamilton, dependent
upon different and more diverse schools ofthought, interpreted the samephenomena
in terms ofconsciousness.
Hamilton elaborated at great length his doctrine of subconscious mental activity.
He carried his novel, radical theory much farther than might be expected. The con-
73HAmTON, Lectures on metaphysics andlogic, Vol. I, pp. 310-36.
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scious, active mind, for so long the preoccupation ofphilosophers, was but a fraction
of the total intellectual apparatus. '. . . the infinitely greater part of our spiritual
treasures lies beyond the sphere ofconsciousness, hid in the obscure recesses of the
mind.'75 But in spite of the dramatic and unusual terminology, Hamilton was
thoroughly in the tradition ofhis Scottish predecessors when he claimed that the new
aspects of the mind could best be observed in certain abnormal mental states. This
relation is illustrated by the following passage, in which Hamilton patterned himself
after Stewart by speaking of madness, delirium, and somnambulism:
... the mind contains certain systems of knowledge, or certain habits of action, which it is
wholly unconscious of possessing in its normal state, but which are revealed in consciousness
in certain extraordinary exaltations of its powers. The evidence on this point shows that the
mind frequently contains whole systems of knowledge, which, though in our normal state
have faded into oblivion, may, in certain abnormal states ofmadness, febrile delirium, somnam-
bulism, catalepsy, etc., flash out into luminous consciousness and even throw into the shade
of unconsciousness those other systems by which they had, for a long time, been eclipsed and
even extinguished.7'
Hamilton did not rigidly adhere to the notion that subconscious activity was only
evident in certain extraordinary states of mind. There were also consciously-
experienced, common phenomena that fitwell with the concept ofa mind that existed
beyond awareness. The most important of these well-known mental events was the
association of several basically unrelated ideas by trains of thought that existed
outside of consciousness. This observation is of extreme importance for our study,
since it gave association psychology an entirely new interpretation. The following
argument from Hamilton's work is included in full, since it admirably demonstrates
the way in which the notion ofmental associations could be linked with the doctrine
ofthe subconscious mind.
. I I Suppose, for instance, that A, B, C, are three distinct thoughts-that A and C cannot
immediately suggest each other, but that each is associated with B, so that A will naturally
suggest B, and B naturally suggest C. Now it may happen that we are conscious of A, and
immediately thereafter of C. How is this anomaly to be explained? It can only be explained on
the principle oflatent modification. A suggests C, not immediately, but through B; but as B ...
does not rise into consciousness, we are apt to consider it as non-existent. You are probably
aware ofthe following fact in mechanics. If anumber of billiardballsbeplaced in a straight row
and touching each other, and if a ball be made to strike in the line of the row, the ball at one
end of the series, what will happen? The motion oftheimpinging ball is not divided among the
whole role; this, which we might a priori have expected, does not happen, but the impetus is
transmitted through the intermediate balls which remain each in its place, to the balls at the
opposite end of the series, and this ballaloneisimpelled on. Something like this often seems to
occur in the train of thought. One idea mediately suggests another into consciousness-the
suggestion passing through one or more ideas which do not themselves rise to consciousness.
The awakening and awakened ideas here correspond to the ball striking and the ball struck off;
while the intermediate ideas, which carrythe suggestion, resemble the intermediate balls which
remain moveless, but commUnicate the impUlse.7"
From its very beginning associationism was explained by reference to mechanical
events of motion and interaction, and Hamilton's comparison of thought con-
nections with colliding billiard balls fitted very well into this tradition.
Hamilton's treatment ofassociationpsychology and the subconscious mind formed
only a small portion ofhis comprehensive philosophical writings. Large selections of
76 Ibid., p. 339. 76IOC. Cit., 77 Ibid., p. 352.
61R. Hoeldtke
his work were not original, but followed contemporary Scottish philosophical
notions. He followed Brown and Stewart in attempting to reconcile Reid's dogmatic
affirmation of mind and the associationists' reserved affirmation of the external
world.78 But Hamilton departed from the Scottish school in accepting the Kantian
emphasis upon the active Ego, important both to his theory ofconsciousness and to
his interpretation of dreams.7' Hamilton claimed it was necessary to turn to the
German philosophers since Stewart and Reid had refrained from following their
psychology to its logical conclusion by correlating it with the doctrine ofconscious-
ness.80 Brett in his History ofPsychology claimed that Hamilton's incorporation of
German idealism was a landmark in British psychology.81 From this point onward
the simple associationism of Hume and Hartley was no longer adequate.
Thomas Laycock's philosophical writings were even more comprehensive and
eclectic than those of Hamilton. A thorough discussion of Laycock's thought would
be a monumental task, and will not be attempted. Much of his writings were based
upon distinctively nineteenth-century developments and are beyond the domain of
this study. His dependence upon the German philosophers exceeded even that of
Hamilton. Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel were all referred to as the source of
his doctrine ofconsciousness.82 But Laycock differed from Hamilton in that he was
more thoroughly within the medical profession. It followed that he was interested
in the developing sciences ofneuroanatomy and neurophysiology, and thought these
studies should encompass the mind and constitute the science of mental physiology.
These ideas corresponded with those of the English school of Spencer, Bain, and
J. S. Mill.83 The situation was further complicated by Laycock's interest in the new
evolutionary theories, and his suggestion that the psychology of animals could be
studied in relation to the evolution of the nervous system.84 Despite these many
interests, Laycock stood directly within the Scottish tradition with which we are
familiar. He was greatly impressed by Hamilton's doctrine of subconscious mental
activity, and incorporated it into his thought unchanged, quoting much ofHamilton
verbatim.85 Descartes' beliefin perpertual consciousness,86 Leibnitz's emphasis upon
the obscure perceptions,87 and the Scottish psychology of dreaming and somnam-
bulism88 were also preserved in Laycock's writing. Even more remarkable is the direct
adoption of Hamilton's new interpretation ofassociation psychology. Laycock went
so far as to claim that Hamilton's most impressive argument for the subconscious
mind derived from his observation of mental associations that existed below the
level ofawareness.89
The two Scottish physicians maintained great authority and influence, and as a
result associationism became intimately linked to the notion of subconscious mental
activity. It was in this highly transformed contextthatthesimplepsychology ofHume
and Hartley waspresented to the medicalpsychologists ofthelate nineteenth century.
7" Ibid., pp. 291-2. 791bid., p. 182. 8' Ibid., p. 189.
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The passive processes of mind implicit in the thought of these early associationists
were now spoken of as subconscious mental functions; and the active faculties of
mind that Reid had borrowed from Aquinas, were now spoken of in terms of the
German concept ofEgo.
CONCLUSIONS
Medical psychology preserved the classical faculties of Aristotle, Galen, and
Thomas Aquinas unaltered until the beginning ofthe eighteenth century. Since this
psychology was closely related to the scholastic concept of the soul, it was held as
dogma until challenged by the empirical philosophy of Locke, Hume and Hartley.
In medicine the faculties were only partially rejected. The old psychology was still
employed by Willis, Rowley, and Crichton. Arnold and Haslam, on the other hand,
forcefully opposed the standard approach, and maintained that the facilities had no
place in the new empiricism in medicine.
Associationism came to play a dominant role in the psychiatric thought of the
eighteenth century. Sensations, or their resulting ideas, were attracted and combined
as though governed by mechanical laws. It was appropriate that the century which
considered sensation and association the basis of rational thought, also considered
these processes basic to proper nervous and mental functioning. Disorders of the
mind were viewed as diseases ofthe sensing and associating mechanisms. Since both
of these processes were controlled by physical, biological factors, it followed that
insanity was an organic disease ofthe brain orthe nerves, for the Zeitgeist demanded
that the new empirical method be applied to tangible, observable matter. In this
way the impact ofNewton upon the philosophy and science ofthe century pervaded
the medical world as well.
The early nineteenth-century physicians rejected the psychology of their pre-
decessors in favour of a more practical and scientific approach, although certain
Scottish philosophers of the period remained interested in the associationism of the
previous century andincorporated it directlyinto their scholasticview ofthefaculties.
In the simplest terms, they gave the process of mental associations the status of a
special faculty ofmind. In this way the two traditions we have traced merged in the
nineteenth century Scottish school. Such a reconciliation could not easily occur and
only became possible by dividing the associating process into its active and passive
components. This basic divisionproved to be more than a mere academic distinction.
It was gradually extended until the entire mental apparatus was split. The original
terminology of Stewart and Brown was based upon the eighteenth-century concepts
ofactivity and passivity. William Hamilton, and his disciple Thomas Laycock, finally
broke into the psychology of the preceding century as they reworked the Scottish
philosophy around the German concept of consciousness. In this way the active
faculties and the passive associations gradually evolved into the psychiatric concepts
ofthe late nineteenth century.
63R. Hoeldtke
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABERCROMBIE, JOHN, Inquiries Concerning the IntellectualPowers and Investigation ofTruth,
Edinburgh, Waugh and Innes, 1832.
AuNs, M., Essay on Classification ofthe Insane, London, John Taylor, 1833.
ARNOLD, THOMAS, Observations on the Nature, Kinds, Causes and Prevention of Insanity,
Lunacy, or Madness, 2 vols., London, G. Ireland, 1782-1786.
BATrTE, WiuLIAM, A Treatise on Madness, London, 1758.
BRowN, THoMAs, Lectures on thePhilosophy ofthe Human Mind, 4 vols., E-dinburgh, James
Ballantyne, 1820.
BuRRows, GEORGE MAN, Commentaries on the Causes, Forms, Symptoms and Treatment,
Moral, Medical ofInsanity, London, 1828.
CHEYNE, GEORGE, The English Malady; or a Treatise of Nervous Diseases of All Kinds,
London, S. Powell, 1733.
CHEYNE, GEORGE, The Natural Method ofCuring Diseases ofthe Body and the Disorders of
the Mind Depending on the Body, London, 1753.
CONOLLY, JoHN, Indications ofInsanity, ed. Hunter and MacAlpine, London, Dawsons of
Pal Mall, 1964.
Cox, J. M., Practical Observations on Insanity, London, E. Bryan, 1813.
CIUCHTON, AIXANDI3R, An Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Mental Derangement,
2 vols., London, 1798.
CROWTHER, BRYAN, Practical Remarks on Insanity; to which is added a Commentary on the
Dissection ofBrains ofManias, London, 1811.
CULLEN, WILLuM, Materia Medica, 2 vols., Philadelphia, Matthew Carey, 1808.
CuLEN, WILLIAM, Practice ofPhysic, 2 vols., Philadelphia, Thomas Dobson, 1816.
DARWIN, ERAsmUS,Zoonomia or theLawsofOrganicLife, 4 vols., London, T. Bentley, 1801.
FALwco, WILLIM, Dissertation on the Infiue ofthe Passions upon the Disorders ofthe
Body, London, 1796.
GREGoRY, JoHN, A Comparative View of the State andFaculties ofMan with Those ofthe
Animal World, London, 1774.
HAMLToN, WIM, Lectures on Metaphysics andLogic, 4 vols., ed. by Monsel and Vetch,
Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood and Sons, 1860.
HwAPER, ANDREw, A 7reatise on the Real Cause and Cure ofInsanity, London, J. Walker,
1789.
HARTuEy, DAVID, Observations on Man, HisFrame, His Duty, andHisExpectations, 2 vols.,
London, W. Eyres, 1801.
HASLAM, JoHN, Observations onInsanity, London, 1798.
HASLAM, JoHN, Observations on Madness andMelancholy, London, Callow, 1809.
HASLAM, JoHN, Sound Mind, London, Longna, Hurst, Rees, Orme, & Brown, 1819.
HumFi, DAVID, Treatise on Human Nature, 2 vols., New York, E. P. Dutton, 1959.
KNIGHT, P. S., Observations on the Causes, Symptomsand Treatment ofDerangement ofthe
Mind, London, Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown & Greene, 1827.
LAWRENCE, SIR WULIAM, Lectures on Physiology. Zoology, and Natural History of Man,
deliveredat the Royal College ofSurgeons, London, 1819.
LAYcOcK, THOMAs, MindandBrain, 2 vob., Edinburgh, Sutherland and Knox, 1860.
LocKE, JOHN, An Essay Concerning Human Understandig, Dublin, Brett Smith, 1816.
MAYO, THomAs, Remarks onInsaity;foundedon thepractice ofJohn Mayo, M.D., London,
1817.
NEVIE, WILLIAM, On Insanity, Its Nature, Causes and Cure, London, 1836.
PERRY,CARuI3S,AMechanicalAccountandExplicationoftheHystericPassion,London, 1755.
PRICHARD, JAMS COWLES, Insanity, London, Sherwood, Gilbert & Piper, 1835.
PRiCHARD, JAMBs COwLES, A Review ofthe Doctrine ofa Vital Principle, London, 1829.
PURCExL, JOHN, A Treatise ofVapours or Hysterie Fits, London, 1707.
REID, THoMAs,Essayon theIntellectualPowersofMan,Boston,Philips, Sampson&Co., 1854.
64The History of Associationism
SEYMOuR, EDWARD J., Observations on the MedicalTreatmentofInsanity, London, Longman,
Rees, Orme & Brown, 1817.
SpuRzHEIM, J., Observations on the Deranged Manifestations of the Mind, or Insanity,
London, Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1817.
SpuRzHEmn, J., A View ofthePhilosophical Principles ofPhrenology, London, 1825.
STEWART, DUGALD, Works, 11 vols., edited by Sir William Hart, Edinburgh, Thomas Con-
stable, 1854.
SER, J., Dissertations on the Features andTreatment ofInsanity, London, 1827.
UWINS, DAVID, A Treatise on those Disorders ofthe Brain and Nervous System, which are
usually called Mental, London, Renshaw & Rush, 1833.
WiLI, FRANCiS, Treatise on Mental Derangement, London, Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme &
Brown, 1823.
SECONDARY SOURCES
BRETr, GEORGE, History ofPsychology, ed. and rev. by R. Peters, New York, Maillan,
1962.
HART, THoMAS, The Thomistic Concept ofMental Faculty, Washington, Catholic University
ofAmerica, 1930.
HUNTE, R., and MACALPIE, I., Three Hundred Years of Psychiatry, London, Oxford
University Press, 1963.
LEIGH, DENJS, The Historical Development ofBritishPsychiatry, vol. 1, New York, Pergamon
Press, 1961.
WARREN, HowAD, A History ofAssociationism, New York, Scribner, 1921.
WHYrE, LANCET LAW, The Unconscious Before Freud, London, Bradford, Dukes, 1960.
ZILBORG, GREGORY, History ofMedicalPsychology, New York, W. W. Norton, 1941.
65